A house is made of bricks, timber, glass, and labour. None of these things is particularly scarce. Yet in London, Paris, Amsterdam, or Prague, buying a home now requires ten, twelve, sometimes fifteen years of a full salary — set aside entirely, spent on nothing else. Thirty years ago it required three or four. Something happened. It was not an accident.

01

The house is not the thing you're buying

The most important insight about housing is that a house has two completely separate components that behave in opposite directions over time.

The building depreciates. It deteriorates, requires maintenance, goes out of fashion, and eventually becomes structurally obsolete. Left alone, a building loses value. The land appreciates. Its value is determined entirely by what surrounds it — the jobs, schools, transport, and people nearby — and as a city grows more productive, the land beneath it becomes more valuable as a pure consequence of everyone else's effort.

Most of what we call "housing wealth" is not wealth created by the owner. It is a claim on a location that has become more valuable because the city around it grew. A house purchased for £200,000 in London in 1990 might sell today for £900,000. The building is not nine times more useful. The land beneath it is nine times more desirable because London became a larger, richer, more connected city — through the collective efforts of millions of people who had nothing to do with that particular house.

Key idea: Economist Henry George noted this in 1879. He argued that taxing land value — not buildings, not income — was the most efficient and equitable tax possible, since it cannot be avoided and does not discourage productive activity. The "land value tax" remains one of the most widely endorsed and least implemented ideas in economics.
02

The city became the only place to be

Through the 1990s and 2000s, the global economy became increasingly knowledge-intensive. The most productive, highest-paid work concentrated in a small number of major cities — finance in London and Frankfurt, technology in a few coastal metros, professional services in national capitals. This was not random. Knowledge work benefits enormously from density: deep labour markets, specialist services clustered nearby, and the informal networks that form when thousands of people in the same field work within walking distance of each other.

The result: the income premium for living in a major city grew sharply. People moved. Demand for housing in those cities concentrated. And because the most productive cities are geographically bounded — you cannot pick up central London and make it bigger — demand chased a fixed supply of desirable locations.

House price index vs wage index — UK 1995–2023 (indexed, 1995 = 100)

03

The people who could say no — did

In a normal market, rising prices are a signal to producers: make more. Housing markets have a structural problem that breaks this mechanism. Building new homes requires planning permission. Planning permission requires approval from local councils. And local councils are elected primarily by existing residents — the majority of whom own their homes.

A homeowner has a direct financial interest in restricting new supply. Every new development adds traffic, changes neighbourhood character, and — in the short term — may reduce nearby property values. Existing residents have rational reasons to oppose new building, and local democratic structures give them the power to succeed. This is "NIMBYism" — Not In My Back Yard — and it is not a personality flaw. It is the predictable output of a system where the costs of development fall on the few and the benefits (more affordable housing) are spread thinly across the many.

The planning veto structure
Developer proposes
50 new homes
→
Local council vote
(mostly homeowners)
→
Objections:
traffic · character
· property values
→
Rejected or
scaled back
Outcome: fewer homes built → prices stay high → existing homeowners' assets appreciate

The numbers are stark. England needs an estimated 300,000 new homes per year to keep pace with population growth and household formation. It has built fewer than 250,000 in every year since 1977. Germany and the Netherlands show similar gaps. The shortfall is not mysterious — it is planned, one refused application at a time.

04

Housing became an investment, not just a home

When house prices consistently outperform other investments — as they have in many European cities since the 1980s — housing starts attracting capital that would otherwise flow elsewhere. Institutional investors, private landlords, and pension funds that treat property as an asset class all benefit from prices rising faster than rents or incomes justify. This financialisation changes the fundamental nature of the market.

In a pure housing market, prices are set by what occupiers — people who want to live somewhere — are willing to pay. In a financialised market, prices are also set by investors who calculate expected future capital gains. An investor is willing to accept a low rental yield if they expect strong price appreciation. This systematically inflates prices above what owner-occupiers alone would support.

House price-to-income ratio — selected European cities, 2023

The feedback loop is self-reinforcing: rising prices attract more investors, who reduce supply available to owner-occupiers, which raises prices further, which validates the investment thesis. At the same time, a growing constituency of asset-owning voters and investors has a direct financial interest in the status quo — which is also the political status quo.

05

Cheap money poured fuel on the fire

From 2009 to 2022, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England held interest rates near zero to stimulate economies recovering from the financial crisis. Low interest rates reduce mortgage repayments, which means buyers can afford to borrow more, which means they bid more for the same house. A house worth £300,000 in repayments at 5% interest might be "worth" £450,000 in repayments at 2% — the monthly payment is the same, but the price is 50% higher.

This is not a conspiracy. Central banks were trying to prevent deflation and unemployment, and low rates were the correct tool for that problem. The side effect — asset price inflation, disproportionately benefiting those who already owned assets — was real but secondary to the goal. When rates rose sharply in 2022–2023, mortgage costs doubled for millions of households. Those who had bought at peak prices with variable mortgages faced payments they had not modelled. The same mechanism that inflated prices on the way up began compressing them on the way down — unevenly, with considerable human cost.

06

The solutions are known. The politics aren't.

The economists broadly agree on what would work. Build substantially more homes in high-demand areas. Reform planning systems to reduce veto power for existing residents. Shift taxation from housing transactions (stamp duty) to land values, reducing the speculative premium. End or reform policies that subsidise demand (help-to-buy schemes) without increasing supply, which simply inflate prices further. Allow greater density — taller buildings, smaller plots — close to transport hubs.

The political economy is the problem. The people who would benefit most from reform — young renters, people not yet born, future migrants — have little political voice. The people who would bear the short-term costs — homeowners facing reduced asset values, developers facing new obligations, councils losing planning revenue — are concentrated, organised, and vote reliably. This is a classic case of diffuse benefits versus concentrated costs, and in democratic systems, concentrated costs almost always win.

The uncomfortable summary: Housing is expensive because a large and politically powerful group of people benefit from it being expensive, have structured the rules to keep it that way, and face no strong electoral incentive to change. This is not a failure of understanding. It is a feature of the current political settlement — one that transfers wealth from renters to owners, from young to old, and from the unborn to the already-housed, continuously and by design.